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1 IntroductionAll agents, whether human or automated, that function in the real-world aresubject to the fact that time is spent as their reasoning progresses. Mostcommon sense reasoning formalisms do not account for the passage of timeas the reasoning occurs, and hence are inadequate from the point of viewof modeling an agent's ongoing process of reasoning. There are numerousproblems in AI-planning and common sense reasoning where the capacityto reason and act in time is of paramount importance. Below is a list offew sample problems in which the passage of time (as the agent reasons) iscrucial:1. Nell & Dudley and the railroad tracks : Nell is tied to the railroad tracksand the agent Dudley must gure out and enact a plan to save her in timebefore an oncoming train approaches.2. Examination problem : A student who is taking an examination mustgure out a strategy to decide which problems to work on, how much time toallocate to each, etc. And yet, every second spent in such decision making isa second less to actually solve the problems. Deliberation time is a signicantchunk of the total time available which the agent must factor in the reasoning.3. The three wise men problem : The well known puzzle [McC78, ED88, KL88]where three wise men, each wearing a cap from a pool of one white and twoblack caps, are lined up and each is asked to announce the color of the capon his own head as soon as he knows what it is. The agents must be able tokeep track of the time spent in reasoning to solve this problem realistically.Most formal approaches do not have an appropriate representationalframework to tackle time-situated reasoning problems such as the above.They assume that an agent is able to reason forever in a timeless present asif the world had stopped for the agent's benet. Resource limitations havebeen of some concern in formal work. In particular, the problem of logi-cal omniscience has received attention in the epistemic logic literature. Itconcerns the diculty with the classical Hintikka possible world semantics[Hin62] that the agent always knows the logical consequences of her beliefs.However, no existing works provide a semantics addressing the issue of howthe reasoning progresses vis a vis the passage of time. Although work intemporal logic involves reasoning about time (e.g., [All84, McD82, ER87]),time is not treated as a crucial resource that must be carefully rationed bythe agent, as it is spent in every step of reasoning.2
Step-logics [EDP90, PEDM] were introduced as a formal apparatus tomodel an agent's ongoing process of reasoning. They have since been ex-tended and renamed as active logics. In [KNP90, NKP91, NKP93] the step-logic framework is used to create an active logic based fully deadline-coupledplanning and reasoning mechanism which is a combination of declarativeand procedural approaches that is capable of solving the above mentionedproblems1. Although active logics have been characterized and implemented,only limited attempts have been made to give a formal semantics for the step-like reasoning process.This paper is intended to bridge the gap between previous modal ap-proaches to knowledge and belief and time-situated frameworks such as step-logics which have a means for attributing time to the reasoning process. Wediscuss the various aspects of logical omniscience and their treatment in sec-tion 2. We briey describe the step-logic approach to reasoning in section3. In section 4 we present a modal active-logic that is step-like in spirit andmotivated by the work on step-logics, but for which, unlike the former, wecan provide a sound and complete modal semantics in section 4.2. In section5 we examine how our approach addresses the logical omniscience problemand summarize our contribution.2 The various aspects of omniscience and itstreatmentFagin and Halpern [FH88] have analyzed what is meant by the notion oflogical omniscience. They dene an agent to be logically omniscient if when-ever he believes formulas in a set , and  logically implies the formula ,then the agent also believes . They further identify three cases of specialinterest: (a) closure under implication, namely, whenever both  and !  are believed then  is believed, (b) closure under valid implication, namely,if  !  is valid and  is believed then  is believed and (c) belief of valid1An active logic for fully deadline-coupled planning has several inference rules for plan-ning with deadlines that are domain independent. These include inference rules for tem-poral projection and book-keeping, checking deadline feasibility, and plan formulation andexecution. Domain specic axioms describe the particular instance of the planning prob-lem. A limited-memory model that addresses two other resources of value: space andparallelism has been integrated into the deadline-coupled reasoning.3
formulas, namely, if  is valid, then  is believed.The agent in the classical model of knowledge [Hin62] has all the unde-sirable properties (a), (b) and (c) above. Several improvements have beensuggested, and they have been broadly classied as \syntactic" and \seman-tic" approaches. In the syntactic approach e.g. [Ebe74, MH79], what theagent knows is represented by a set of formulas and hence is not constrainedunder consequence. But such approaches are dicult to analyze, since theyare not guided by knowledge-based principles. A commendable syntactic ap-proach is presented by Konolige in his deduction model [Kon83] which givesa formal characterization of explicit beliefs and captures how agents syntac-tically derive new beliefs, possibly with an incomplete set of inference rules.In contrast, semantic approaches attempt to give semantics similar inmost cases to the possible world semantics, but with \xes". Levesque[Lev84] gives a semantic account of implicit and explicit belief where im-plicit beliefs are the logical consequences of explicit belief. A solution to(a) and the possibility of having contradictory beliefs is achieved by intro-ducing an articial notion of incoherent or impossible worlds. Levesque'sapproach was subject to the criticism that an agent in the logic is a per-fect reasoner in relevance logic. Levesque's ideas have been extended in[PS85] and [Lak86]. Montague has given a possible world semantics thatgets around problem (a) of logical consequence. We use the main idea in thismodel, namely, to dene knowledge as a relation between a world and a set ofsets of possible worlds. However, we provide the distinction of incorporatingtime-situatedness. Vardi [Var86] provides a co-relation between restrictionson models in the Montague semantics and the corresponding agent propertiesthat they characterize.Fagin and Halpern [FH88] have presented a series of interesting approachesto limited reasoning that marry the syntactic and semantic approaches. Theyprovide an extension to Levesque's approach for the multi-agent case, andintroduce a notion of awareness. They also provide an approach to localreasoning that they call a society of minds approach. Fagin and Halpern'sawareness notion, in their logic of general awareness acts like a lter on se-mantic formulations. It has been evaluated and criticized in [Kon86]. Oneof the criticisms is that the model is unintuitive, since it is unlikely that anagent can compute all logical consequences, discarding the one's that it is notaware of, say, because of memory limitations, because in fact, agents are alsoaected by time limitations. There are a number of works that have consid-4
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 : : :... Figure 1: Step-logic studiesered logics of knowledge and time e.g. [Sat77, Leh84, KL88, LR86, Ash88].Fagin and Halpern discuss the possibility of capturing bounded and situatedreasoning by letting the awareness set vary over time. However, no attempthas been made to systematically study and model situations where the pas-sage of time is a critical issue.3 The step-logic approach to reasoningStep-logics [EDP90] were introduced to model a common sense agent's on-going process of reasoning in a changing world. A step-logic is characterizedby a language, observations and inference rules. A step is dened as a fun-damental unit of inference time. Beliefs are parameterized by the time takenfor their inference, and these time parameters can themselves play a role inthe specication of the inference rules and axioms. The most obvious waytime parameters can enter is via the expression Now(i), indicating the timeis now i. Observations are inputs from the external world, and may ariseat any step i. When an observation appears, it is considered a belief in thesame time-step. Each step of reasoning advances i by 1. At each new stepi, the only information available to the agent upon which to base his furtherreasoning is a snap-shot of his deduction process completed up to and in-cluding step i  1. Figure 1, adapted from [ED88] illustrates three steps in astep-logic with Modus Ponens as one of its inference rules.Elgot-Drapkin also characterized an array of eight step-logics in increasingorder of sophistication with respect to three mechanisms : self-knowledge5
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obs ::: ObservationFigure 2: Inference rules for an SL5 logic(S), time (T) and retraction (R)2. According to this classication, SL5 is thesimplest dynamic deductive logic with time and self-knowledge capability,but no retraction mechanism (no ability to handle contradictions). An SL5logic is a triple hL; OBS; INF i where L consists of propositions (with theaddition of time), OBS is an observation function describing inputs from theworld at each step, and INF is a set of inference rules. We describe an SL5step-logic to which we provide a modal active-logic analog. The set INF forit is shown in in gure 2.We have chosen the simplest SL5 since our main interest is in the treat-ment of time and in modeling agents with nested beliefs. We will impose anadditional constraint on models that does not allow for contradictions in theagent's beliefs3.4 A modal active-logic for reasoning in timeWith SL5 as the motivation, we provide a time-situated modal logic. Thismodal logic is based on Montague's intensional logic of belief [Mon70], thatuses structures referred to in the literature as neighborhood structures orminimal structures [Che80]. They were rst used in [Mon68] and in [Sco70].2SL0:none; SL1:S; SL2:T; SL3:R; SL4:S,R; SL5:S,T; SL6: R,T; and SL7:S,T,R.3However, this condition may be relaxed if for example, we desire to model an agentwith default reasoning capability. Step-logics are inherently nonmonotonic and allow forimplicit and explicit contradictions in the agent's reasoning. The modal logic approachwhich is motivated by the step-logic work is powerful enough to deal with contradictions.6
Montague gives a possible world semantics to epistemic logic where, unlikein the classical model4, knowledge is dened as a relation between a worldand a set of sets of worlds. An intension of a formula  denoted by jjjj isthe set of worlds w such that w j= .We prefer to use timelines instead of possible worlds, since this givesus a way to naturally incorporate time into our framework. L denotes theset of timelines [TSSK91]. We consider time lines that are restricted to benite from one side and innite from the other (i.e., are rays). At everytime point in each timeline some propositions are true and the rest are false.In particular, there is one timeline of most interest, that captures the realhistory of occurrences in the world. We call this line lh 2 L the historytimeline.4.1 Syntax and semanticsIn the logic proposed, the agent reasons in a propositional language withtime. The interest is in sentences such as:p: Nell is tied to the railroad tracks at 3 pm.q: Dudley is at home at 3:30 pm.Formally, we assume that there is a set P of propositions and a set TCof time point constants. We dene PT = P  TC as the set of propositionsextended to include time arguments. The formulas in PT are the basicelements of our language, and we will denote them as p( ) where p 2 Pand  2 TC. The language G is the smallest set that contains PT , and isclosed under the :;^;_;! connectives, and contains B whenever  is inthe language and  2 TC5. This language can easily be extended to includemultiple agents, by the use of an additional parameter i, so that Bi denotes\at time  agent i believes in ", where  may include beliefs of other agents.4The classical possible-worlds model is based on the idea that besides the true world,there are other possible worlds, some of which may be indistinguishable to the agentfrom the true world. An agent is said to believe a fact  if  is true in all the worldsthat she thinks possible. A semantics based on Kripke structures for this classical modelsuers from the well known drawback from the point of view of logical omniscience thatK ^K(!  ) ! K is an inherent axiom.5In this language one can express formulas such as p and q above, belief formulas such asB1p(2) to mean \at time 1 the agent believes that p is true at time 2", or nested beliefsformulas such as B1 (B1+2p(2)_B1+2q(3)) to mean \at time 1 the agent believes thattwo time points later she will believe p(2) or she will believe q(3)".7
Time is a pair hT;i where  is a total order on T . A structure in theproposed time-embedded active logic is: M = hL; T; v;; ;B;OBSi where L is the set of timelines, hT;i is a time structure. v : TC ! T is the interpretation function for time point constants6.  : P  T ! 2L is a truth assignment to the formula p 2 P for eachtimeline l; l 2 L and time point t 2 T . Thus  denes the intensions ofthe base formulas of our language. B : L  T ! 22L is a belief accessibility relation, dened for eachtimeline, time point pair (l; t); l 2 L; t 2 T . OBS : L T ! G is the observation function.We will use Bt(l) to denote B(l; t), which is the set of sets of time linesrelated to l at time t through the B relation. Note the use of the pair (l; t).We are interested in epistemic behavior over time, and this is depicted bythe evolution of beliefs (and the corresponding accessibility relations) from(lh; t) to (lh; t+ 1) in the real timeline.Analogous to the Montague intensional logic, we dene B to denotethat an agent \believes a formula  at time " and dene a satisabilityrelation for timelines based on intensions. An intension of a formula  in astructure M denoted by jjjj is fl j l 2 L; M; l j= g.Figure 3 illustrates the neighborhood structures for our modal logic7.We impose restrictions on models to reect the step-like reasoning be-havior between successive time instances. These restrictions make certainaxioms sound in our system. We further characterize the modal active-logic6For all ;  0 2 TC if v( )  v( 0) and there is no t 2 T such that v( )  t  v( 0) wewill use  + 1 to denote  0. Similarly, for t; t0 2 T where t  t0 and there is no such t, weuse t+ 1 to denote t0.7We comment here that is is possible to extend the modal active-logics to multipleagents reasoning in time. A structure for an active logic with multiple agents is M =hL; T; v; ;A;B1; : : : ;Bni. L is the set of time lines and  is the truth assignments to baseformulas as before. A is the set of agents f1; : : : ; ng, and each of Bi; i = 1; : : : ; n associateswith a timeline, time point pair (l; t), a set of set of timelines that are belief-accessible froml at time t from the perspective of agent i 2 A. In problems such as the three wise menproblem mentioned in the introduction, a multi-agent logic where the time of all agentsincrements synchronously can provide an elegant solution to the problem.8
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B(l; t)s1 s2s1 s2 s1 ^ s2s3  s1Figure 3: Neighborhood structures for the belief operatorby a sound and complete set of axioms and inference rules. Time is an es-sential resource in this framework and is consumed in the reasoning process.This logic captures the reasoning process of a non-omniscient resource-limitedagent.We formally dene j= for the structure M = hL; T; v;; ;Bi describedabove as follows:1. This denes satisability of the base formulas of our language.M; l j= p( ) if l 2 (p; v( ))2. This denes satisability of negated formulasM; l j= : i M; l 6j= 3. This denes satisability of formulas formed with the ^ connective.M; l j= ( ^  ) i M; l j=  and M; l j=  9
4. This denes the satisability of the belief formulas.M; l j= B i jjjj 2 Bv()(l)The satisfability of _ and! is dened accordingly. We impose the followingrestrictions on our models to describe an agent who reasons in a step-likefashion like its motivating step-logic agent described by SL5.1. 8l 2 L;8t 2 T fg 62 Bt(l) and if s1; s2 2 Bt(l) then s1 \ s2 6= fg.This says that the agent's belief set will be consistent at every timepoint. As explained before, we introduce this restriction to model asimple agent without contradictory beliefs and without any mechanismsfor retraction8.2. 8l 2 L;8t 2 T if s1; s2 2 Bt(l), then s1 \ s2 2 Bt+1(l)This restriction constrains models at successive time points to be onestep richer than their predecessors, in the sense that the agent hasadded all possible pairwise conjunctions of previous beliefs to the cur-rent step, but each pair participates just once9.3. 8l 2 L;8t 2 T if s1 2 Bt(l), and s2  s1 then s2 2 Bt+1(l)This restriction says that detachments of beliefs from a time step agoare added to the current set.4. If  2 OBS(l; t) then jjjj 2 Bt(l).An agent situated in the real world must have the ability to acquirenew information through observation. This restriction allows for thatcapability.5. 8l jjtruejj = L 2 Bt0(l).Since the set T is ordered under , and timelines are dened as rays,we can dene a start point t0. This restriction says that the agentbelieves in true at the beginning of time.8This restriction can be relaxed if the intent is to model a fallible agent who does defaultreasoning and may be permitted to have contradictory beliefs at any given time. Withoutthe above restriction the neighborhood structures possibly allow for both M; l j= B andM; l j= B:, since both jjjj and jj:jj could belong to Bv()(l).9For example, if M; l j= B, M; l j= B and M; l j= B then M; l j= B+1( ^ ),M; l j= B+1( ^ ) and M; l j= B+1( ^ ) but M; l j= B+1( ^  ^ ) does not followfrom this restriction, however M; l j= B+2( ^  ^ ) does.10
4.2 Soundness and completenessTheorem : The set of axioms (A1{A4) and inference rules (R1{R5) in Fig-ure 4 provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the modal active-logicfor reasoning in time.Proof (sketch) : Soundness follows in a straightforward fashion from theinterpretation of ^ and : in the denition of j= and from the restrictionson the models described in section 4. The proof of completeness hinges onthe denition of a canonical model M c in which every consistent10 formulais satisable. In M c we have a timeline corresponding to every maximalconsistent set V . For denition and properties of maximal consistent sets werefer to [HY92]. We let M c = hL; T; v;; ;Bi whereL = f lV : V is a maximal consistent set g;lV 2 (p; v( )) i p( ) 2 V; andBt(lV ) = f I ;V j Bt 2 V g [ f S j S  S0; S0 2 Bt 1(lV ) gwhere t  0 and I ;V = f lW j  2 W g, and B0(lV ) = f I ;V j Bt 2 V g.We then prove using induction that M c; l j=  i  2 V , which provesthat all consistent formulas are satisable in this structure. For space con-servation, we do not provide the details of the proof here.5 ConclusionActive logics capture the process of reasoning of a resource-limited agent asit goes on in time. As time progresses, the agent draws more inferences (newbeliefs) at each time step. Thus, an agent does not draw all the consequencesof its current set of beliefs  all at once, but continues to add conclusions tothis set in accordance with a set of inference rules. This is reected by theincreasing size of B(lh; t), where lh denotes the real history of occurrences inthe world, and B(lh; t) reects what the agent believes in time t. The agentis certainly not guilty of omniscience under (a) logical consequence11 sinceit is trivial to provide a counter-model to B B( ! ); :B. Byvirtue of a description that is based on intensions of formulas, it is dicult10A formula  is provable if  is one of the axioms or follows from provable formulas byapplication of one or more inference rules. A formula  is consistent if : is not provable.11The agent may eventually compute all logical consequences of its belief set if it has aset of complete agent inference rules. 11
Axioms :(A1) All tautologies of propositional logic.(A2) :Bfalse. Consistency(A3) B ^B ! B+1( ^  ). Conjunction(A4) B( ^  )! B+1. DetachmentaInference Rules :(R1) From `  and ` !  infer `  Modus Ponens(R2) From ` !  infer ` B! B+1 Weak closure under valid consequence(R3) From ` $  infer ` B$ B Belief in equivalent formulas(R4) From `  infer ` B Belief in tautologies(R5) If  is observed at time  infer ` B ObservationaInheritance follows from either (A3) or (A4) when  =  .Figure 4: Characterization of the modal active-logicto distinguish between semantically equivalent beliefs. As such, (c) belief ofvalid formulas and a weak version of (b) closure under valid consequence12follows.However, it is possible to modify our logic by providing a syntactic way tocurtail the size of the belief set by introducing an additional elementG to thestructure M . G  G is dened as the agent's language and is closed undersubformulas. An agent believes in  (i.e., B ) only if  2 G. For thisnew structure, the set of axioms and inference rules are suitably modiedto capture this change (e.g., in (A3)  ^  2 G and in (R4)  2 G isadded) and appropriate restrictions are placed on M . In essence, Bt(l) setsare ltered by G for all t and l. It can be proven that the modied set ofaxioms and inferences are sound and complete with respect to the modiedstructure. If the model includes more than one agent, each of them mayhave a dierent language G. This restricts an agent who believes in , toonly that subset of [] (the equivalence class of ) which is in the agent'slanguage. The agent also believes only those tautologies that are in G. Hencethe scope of (b) and (c) is reduced in the modied structure. The agent'slanguage G has similarities to the awareness set concept of [FH88]. If one12In our logic, by (R2), it takes an agent one period of time to deduce the consequence.12
considers multiagent belief operators Bi without a time parameter then amodied version of Axioms (A2), (A4) and (R4) from gure 4 are true in themodel of local reasoning of [FH88], (without modalities for implicit belief).Note, that we have only explicit beliefs, and there is no notion of implicitbeliefs. In [FH88] the models are still static, in that even though they suggestincorporating reasoning about time, and changing awareness functions, thereis no way to account for inference time in their models.Parallels to more advanced step-logics for planning and default reasoninghave also been developed. These logics have two additional modal operatorsD and P for default beliefs and temporal projections respectively. Bothoperators are dened using the Montague style semantics similar to that usedto dene B but with a dierent set of restrictions to allow for contradictionsarising due to defaults and to reect the notion of persistence. A futurepaper will describe these logics.
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